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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Was the trial court correct in ruling that there was no
genuine issue of a material fact and plaintiff waived any
rights he may have had to extra sales commissions and that
defendants were therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of
law?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action commenced by B. R. Woodward and Woodward
Marketing, Inc. to recover extra commissions allegedly earned
under the terms of a written agreement with defendants.

Course of Proceedings Below
Following a hearing upon defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, the trial court found that plaintiff had raised no
genuine issue as to a material fact and that, as a matter of
law, plaintiff waived any right he may have had to additional
compensation under a written agreement between himself and
defendants.
Statement of Facts
1.

On or about February 24, 1983, plaintiff B. R.

Woodward Marketing, Inc. ("Woodward"), and defendant, Collins
Food Service, Inc. ("Collins"), entered into a sales representative agreement (the "contract").
2.

Pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of the contract, the

parties agreed to compensate Woodward monthly according to a
sliding scale with respect to sales recorded in a "Daily Sales
by Salesman" report, with payments to be made on the 20th day
of each month.
3.

Woodward and Collins also agreed in the contract as

follows:
In the event that a sales account becomes worthless
after the payment to Woodward Marketing of the Incentive Commission described in paragraph 4(b) [sic;
should be 3(b)] the amount of such Incentive Commission paid will be deducted in the subsequent payment
period.

-2-

4.

Woodward was aware that commissions under paragraph

3(b) were to be paid on the 20th day of each month:
Q.

(by Mr. Smith) You were aware, were you not, that the
commissions, if there were any, were to be paid on the
20th day of each month; correct?

A,

(by Mr. Woodward)

That's right.

Woodward Deposition, p. 49.
5.

Although Woodward claimed to have copies of a "Daily

Sales by Salesman" report, he never requested any commissions
based on that report:
Q.

When you knew what it [Sales by Salesman Report]
was, did you ask for it?

A.

Yes, at that point in time.

Q.

And received it?

A.

Right.

Q.

And you had that report in front of you; correct?

A,

Yes, for a few month period.

Q.

Did you ever request commissions based on that
report?

A.

No I didn't.

Woodward Deposition, pp. 48-49.
6.

Woodward felt that he was entitled to a commission

under paragraph 3(b) but did not request payment*
Q.

Well, did you feel you were entitled to a commission under paragraph 3?

A.

I felt I did. I chose not to make any comment or
ask for anything.

-3-

Salt Lake was in total chaos and I had been made
quite aware that the money I was being paid was
more than anybody else. And I felt that asking
for more moneyf or even, you know, even questioning the commission situation, might jeopardize my
standing in the company. So I just kind of
rolled over and played dead.

Q.

And so you're telling us that you knew that you
were entitled to incentive commission, yet you
never requested it at any time during the time
you were employed?

A.

In that whole period, no.

7.

Woodward stated that the reason he didn't ask for the

commission is that he was afraid that Collins might fire him,
and that in view of the situation in the Salt Lake City office,
he was "more than willing to settle for $45,000 a year" which
he was already being paid under paragraph 3(a) of the contract.
8.

Woodward Deposition, p. 62.
Collins had the right, pursuant to the Agreement, to

cancel the Agreement upon 30 days written notice to Woodward.
(R.9)
9.

Woodward made no request, written or oral, for any

commission under paragraph 3(b) of the contract until after he
was terminated.
Q.

Now, when was the first time in which you thought
that you were owed something under the incentive
commission clause of the contract 3(b)?

-4-

I guess it was in March of '83— '84?
'83 was the year you were hired.
Yes, '83.
The first month you went with No; May.

It was May.

Excuse me.

Two months after - March, April, May Right.
And you were aware of what your sales were, I
take it?
I knew what the sales different customers were
producing, yes.
And you felt at the time you were owed the commission under 3(b) of the contract?
Yes. Based on my understanding, I thought that
the money was due me, yes.
And you've earlier stated that you never made any
request for the money, orally or in writing,
until after you were terminated; correct?
Other than a comment to Craig Hansen. But that
was not even a request. It was like, "What the
hell's going on?" you know.
And the reason you said that you thought it might
cause your termination if you asked about that?

And you testified earlier that you waited until
you had nothing to lose to make the claim; correct?
That made sense to me.
Kind of lying in the weeds during the time you
were employed there?

-5-

A.

They never made much money. Even the whole time
I was there was - you know,

Q.

So you really didn't think that the situation
justified paying any more salary or any more commission?

A.

Well/ whether I testified or notf I didn't think
it would be a smart move for me to ask for more
money under the conditions.

Woodward Deposition/ pp. 100-103.
10.

Woodward was terminated by Collins on or about

October 22f 1984. Woodward Deposition/ Exhibit 8.
11.

Woodward first made a claim for the extra commissions

on November 15f 1984, and filed suit on November 16/ 1984.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At Woodward's deposition he expressly admitted that he
chose not to assert any claim for extra commissions during the
period he was employed but ratherf in his own wordsf "just kind
of rolled over and played dead."

On the basis of undisputed

facts/ he waived his claim for extra commissions and the trial
Court properly so ruled.
Woodward has not succeeded in manufacturing a genuine issue
of a material fact by creating a conflict between his deposition testimony and a later affidavit.

The clear statements in

his deposition/ subject to cross-examination by his own counsel/ should control.
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Woodwardfs conduct forms the basis for denying the
requested relief both under principles of implied waiver and
estoppelf and the trial court's ruling should stand.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT
THERE WERE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACT AND THAT DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In an order signed November 5, 1985, the trial court
granted Collins1 Motion for Summary Judgment and ruled that
there were no genuine issues of material fact and, as a matter
of law, Woodward had waived any right he may have had to claim
additional compensation under the agreement between the parties.
Summary Judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute
as to a material fact and if the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.

Horgan v. Industrial Design Corporation,

657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982).
A.

Woodward's Conduct Is Not In Dispute.

It cannot be disputed that, in the event Woodward actually
believed he had the right to additional commissions pursuant to
the contract, he never chose to assert that right at any time
during his employment with Collins.
1.

Woodward admitted that he did not assert the

right he is now claiming.
At his deposition, when questioned about the extra commissions, Woodward stated that although he felt he was entitled to
-7-

a commission under paragraph 3, he "chose not to make any comment or ask for anything. . . .

I just kind of rolled over and

played dead."
It is also clear that Woodward knew that any commissions
due him under paragraph 3(b) of the contract were to be paid on
the 20th of each month on a month-to-month basis. Had Woodward
made a claim for what Collins viewed to be double commission,
at the time when such commissions were to be paid, Collins
could have made a business decision to terminate Woodward pursuant to the 30-day notice period of the contract.

Because

Woodward did not assert his alleged rights, Woodward now claims
the right to double commissions over the complete period of his
employment.

His considered decision to "roll over and play

dead" thus engendered detrimental reliance on the part of
Collins.
2.

Woodward's attempt to manufacture an issue of

fact should be disregarded.
At his deposition, Brad Woodward stated that he never made
any request for extra money, either orally or in writing, until
after he was terminated (Statement of Facts, H 9 ) . At Collins1
Motion for Summary Judgment he attempted to raise an issue of
fact by stating, in an affidavit, that he had reminded officers
of Collins about his right to extra money.

In Webster v. Sill,

675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983), this court stated:

-8-

As a matter of general evidence law, a deposition
is generally a more reliable means of ascertaining the
truth than an affidavit, since a deponent is subject
to cross-examination and an affiant is not. That does
not mean, however, that in summary judgment proceedings, a deposition should be accorded greater weight
than an affidavit. The purpose of summary judgment is
not to weigh the evidence. But when a party takes a
clear position in a deposition, that is not modified
on cross-examination, he may not thereafter raise an
issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts
his deposition, unless he can provide an explanation
of the discrepancy. A contrary rule would undermine
the utility of summary judgment as a means for screening out sham issues of fact.
Id. at 1172-73 (citations omitted).
Such appears to be the situation here.

The trial court

properly rejected Woodward's attempt to manufacture an issue of
fact.
It should also be pointed out that the mere existence of
genuine issues of fact in a case does not preclude entry of a
summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to resolution
of the case.

Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751,

752 (Utah 1982).

On all material issues in this case, there is

no dispute as to the crucial facts relied upon by the trial
court in granting Collins' motion for summary judgment.
B.

Woodward's Conduct Constitutes An Implied Waiver.

The terms waiver and estoppel are often used interchangeably, partly because estoppel and waiver can, and often do,
spring from the same conduct.

There are differences between

-9-

the two doctrines, however, waiver being the voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right, and estoppel being
defined as action or conduct which precludes a party from
asserting its rights where said action or conduct renders it
inequitable to allow the party to assert those rights.
v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983).

Hunter

The facts of this

case support either theory.
The circumstances of this case are very similar to those
set forth in the case of Celmer v. Schmitt, 645 P.2d 946 (Mont.
1982), wherein an employee was hired at a certain salary, plus
other allowances, eventually quit, and following his termination, sued for overtime compensation.

The court noted that one

substantial issue would be determined on appeal, namely,
whether the employer had failed to fully compensate the
employee during his course of employment.

The court affirmed

the district's court denial of additional compensation to the
employee, stating:
In any event, an employee would be estopped from
claiming compensation for overtime work where he
failed to report it to or informed his employer that
he expected compensation for and until he instituted
suit after his discharge.
Id. at 948.
The court in Celmer also cited the case of Herman v. Golden
Arrow Dairy, 71 P.2d 581 (Wash. 1937).
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In Herman, a discharged

employee sued his former employer for wages relating to overtime work.

The court held that the employee's wages were con-

trolled by the union scale which mandated pay at time and a
half for overtime.

The court noted, however, that even though

the union was enforcing the pay scale, the employee did not
demand overtime pay from his employer when it was to be paid
and was estopped from later asserting it:
Even then he did not report it [the overtime work] or
advise the appellant [employer] that he was expecting
compensation for it at the union scale, although he
was receiving monthly settlements on the per diem
union scale basis. The first notice appellant had of
any claim of overtime was when this suit was instituted. Assuming that, under the terms of the contract, he would have been entitled to overtime, he has
by his conduct estopped himself from claiming compensation for it. So furtive an attempt to pass liability on another is not to be countenanced.
Id. at 582-83 (citations omitted).
Although the foregoing cases talk in terms of estoppel,
Woodward's conduct also amounts to a waiver of any right to
claim privileges or benefits under Paragraph 3(b) of the contract.

A waiver is the "voluntary and intentional relinquish-

ment of a known claim or privilege."

Phoenix Ins. Co. v.

Heath, 61 P.2d 308 (Utah 1936), 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and
Waiver § 154.
Waiver can also arise by conduct, in which case it is
called an "implied waiver."

The doctrine requires a detri-

mental reliance by the party who is led, by another's conduct,
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to believe a waiver has occurred.

Thus, the doctrine of

"implied waiver" is akin to estoppel.
County, 627 P.2d 845, 850 (Mont. 1981).

Reiter v. Yellowstone
The rule is summarized

as follows:
An implied waiver may arise where a person has pursued
such a course of conduct as to evidence an intention
to waive a right, or where his conduct is inconsistent
with any other intention than to waive it. Waiver may
be inferred from conduct or acts putting one off his
guard and leading him to believe that a right has been
waived.
28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 160.

See also Northern

Arizona Gas Service, Inc. v. Petrolane Transport, Inc., 702
P.2d 696 (Ariz. 1984), and Steiger v. Commerce Acceptance of
Oklahoma City, Inc., 455 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1969).
It would be an injustice to allow Woodward, during the term
of his employment, to fail to assert the right he believed he
had under the contract, continue his employment and after being
terminated obtain all of the amounts he failed to request during his term of employment.

Woodward should not be allowed to

come through the back door on a claim which he himself felt
Collins would not have allowed if requested at the time it was
to have been paid.

Woodward's silence was the result of a

calculated decision which was intended to, and did, result in
detrimental reliance on the part of Collins.

Such conduct

resulted in an implied waiver of any rights he may now urge
under his own interpretation of the contract.

-12-

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Collins respectfully requests that
Woodward's appeal be dismissed, that the judgment of the trial
court be affirmed, and that Collins be awarded its costs herein.
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